Wednesday, 26 November 2025

Misreading Relational Ontology II: 1 Why It Is Not Idealism

(You’re Importing the Wrong Categories)

There is a predictable mistake some readers will make when encountering a relational ontology: they will assume it is a form of idealism. The reasoning goes like this:

“If you say reality is relationally construed, you must mean the mind is creating the world.”

This is a category error.
More precisely: it is an attempt to translate relational ontology into the conceptual vocabulary of a representational metaphysics — a translation that can only produce distortion.

Let’s state this plainly:

Relational ontology is neither idealism nor materialism.
It rejects the mind–world, subject–object, inner–outer partitions on which those positions depend.

To call it idealism is to mistake the map for the terrain and the terrain for the old terrain you already believe in.


1. No Mind–Matter Split, No Idealism

Idealism (in any of its classical forms) still assumes:

  • mind

  • that holds or generates

  • representations

  • “in” an interior mental space

  • which construct or determine the world.

Our ontology denies every one of these commitments.

There is no mental interior doing representational work.
There is no autonomous mind that stands apart from the world.
There is no metaphysical subject whose ideas generate reality.
There are no representations through which the world is known.

Once these commitments disappear, idealism cannot even get started.
Idealism requires a metaphysics of insides — and relational ontology has none.

It offers, instead:

circulating potentials, perspectival cuts, and actualisations that emerge through structured relational dynamics.

Nothing here is “mental.”


2. Construal ≠ Mental Projection

A second confusion: the assumption that construal is a kind of psychological act — a mind imposing form on raw reality.

But construal is not interior, not psychological, and not representational.
It is:

  • a perspectival cut,

  • an emergent alignment in potential,

  • a structured way a system actualises an event within its relational lattice.

To treat it as “mental projection” is simply to import the very model of mind already rejected.

As soon as construal is misunderstood as an inner activity, the entire relational architecture collapses back into dualism.
That is precisely the misunderstanding this series is here to prevent.


3. Relational Actualisation Is Not “Ideas Making Reality”

Idealism says:
the world is a product of mind.

Relational ontology says:
worlds are the patterned actualisations of potential through relational constraints.

No one — no mind, no subject, no consciousness — is fabricating reality.
Rather:

  • potentials

  • relations

  • systems

  • perspectival cuts

  • and constraints

co-produce actual events.

This is ontogenetic, not mental.

The world is not “constructed by thinking.”
It is actualised through relational dynamics, of which humans are but one node among many.


4. You Cannot Square a Relational Ontology Inside a Representational Worldview

If someone approaches this ontology and tries to place it on the familiar philosophical map (“Is this idealism or materialism?”), they will necessarily misread it.

Because the map they are using was drawn by:

  • realists

  • representationalists

  • reductionists

  • dualists

  • and 19th-century metaphysicians

who assumed that the universe naturally divides into mind and matter.

Our ontology begins elsewhere entirely:

with potential, relation, construal, actualisation, and perspectival emergence.

Trying to classify that inside the mind–world binary is like trying to file quantum field theory under “phlogiston chemistry.”
The categories do not align.


5. What Relational Ontology Is (in Minimal Terms)

For the reader who wants the cleanest possible formulation:

  1. Reality is structured potential, not inert substance.

  2. Events are actualisations of potential through relational cuts.

  3. Construal is perspectival, not psychological.

  4. Systems and instances co-constitute each other.

  5. Meaning and reality are inseparable at the level of event, not because mind creates the world, but because there is no non-construed event.

This is process-relational realism, not idealism.


6. If You Think This Is Idealism, You Are Still Thinking Inside the Old Grid

And that’s the point of this post.

When you accuse a relational ontology of idealism, you reveal that you still believe:

  • in minds as containers

  • in worlds as objects

  • in representations as mirrors

  • in subject–object dualism

  • in interiority as metaphysical ground

Your refutation lands on a strawman of your own making.


The Work of This Series

In the posts that follow, we will continue clarifying the most common misreadings:

  • internal vs external

  • subjective vs objective

  • knowledge vs world

  • psychology vs construal

  • constructionism vs relational actualisation

  • explanation vs reduction

  • and the entire habit of translating relational categories into representational ones.

Each post will recut the misunderstanding at its hinge.

But this is the crucial opening move:

Relational ontology is not idealism because it does not share the metaphysical architecture that makes idealism possible.

If you import that architecture in order to classify it, you have already misread it.

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