Misreading Relational Ontology: 3 Why Perspectival ≠ Subjective (And Why Psychology Is the Wrong Frame)

Relational ontology is frequently misread through the lens of psychology. The term “perspectival” tempts readers to equate it with “subjective experience,” “conscious point of view,” or “mental framing.” This is a mistake. Perspectival instantiation is ontological, not psychological. Confusing the two leads to a cascade of category errors, often reducing relational ontology to an accidental form of idealism or mentalism.

What does “perspectival” actually mean here? It denotes that systems actualise possibilities relative to a specific relational cut. A cut is not a mind, a subject, or a vantage point in the cognitive sense. It is a slice of systemic potential. Each perspectival instantiation shows a specific configuration of relations—its “shape” depends on the systemic context, not on feelings, awareness, or cognition.

The error is understandable: psychology has trained us to see perspectives as tied to conscious agents. But relational ontology deliberately decouples perspectival instantiation from consciousness. Systems can actualise folds without minds; folds can interrelate without awareness. Subjectivity is neither required nor assumed. Reading “perspectival” as “subjective” collapses the formal ontology into a mentalist frame, which it was never intended to occupy.

A practical symptom of this misreading: when asked, “What does the system experience?” readers are already thinking in the wrong categories. Relational ontology does not describe experience—it describes relations and the conditions under which possibilities are instantiated. Asking about experience is asking the wrong question. The correct question is: “Which relational potentials are being actualised, and from which cut?”

Another common misstep: assuming that perspectival instantiations imply observer-dependence in the epistemic sense. They do not. A fold actualises perspectivally regardless of human observation. The observer is neither necessary nor relevant to the ontology. Treating relational cuts as “points of view” in the psychological sense reintroduces the very dualism relational ontology aims to dissolve: mind vs. world, inside vs. outside, subjective vs. objective.

Navigating this trap requires vigilance:

1. Check for psychology. Whenever a discussion of perspectival instantiation invokes “experience,” “awareness,” or “perception,” a misreading has occurred.

2. Translate questions into systemic terms. Replace “What does it perceive?” with “Which potential actualises, and along which cut?”

3. Maintain the cut. Perspectival instantiation is a formal relation, not a cognitive stance.

In short: perspectival does not equal subjective. It is a formal, relational, ontological concept. Psychology is the wrong lens; mentalist frames are distractions. Once this distinction is clear, the ontology’s coherence, precision, and explanatory power become visible.

Next in the series: why relational epistemology strengthens, rather than weakens, scientific practice.