Thursday, 27 November 2025

Likely Misunderstandings of Relational Ontology: 2: Why Relational Ontology Is Not Anti-Science

(And why representational metaphysics is the real threat to scientific practice)

One of the most knee-jerk misunderstandings of relational ontology is the accusation that it somehow undermines, dismisses, or relativises science.

This charge is usually made by people who equate science with a very particular metaphysics:

  • objectivist realism

  • mirror-theory of knowledge

  • representational models as metaphysical truths

  • a belief that “the world” is simply “out there” waiting to be mirrored

In other words:
They mistake the philosophy of 19th-century positivism for the practice of science.

Relational ontology does not threaten science.
It threatens scientism — the metaphysics, not the method.

Let’s cut the confusion.


1. Science Is Already Relational — Only Its Self-Description Is Representational

Every working scientist knows, in practice, that:

  • measurements are system-specific

  • models are perspectival

  • observation depends on apparatus

  • different methods carve different phenomena

  • concepts evolve with the communities that use them

  • data only exist within experimental cuts

None of this is controversial inside the lab.

The representational story (“we mirror reality”) is something scientists only say outside the lab — usually when cornered by philosophers.

Relational ontology simply formalises what scientific practice has already known for centuries:

Science is a disciplined way of constraining, coordinating, and stabilising relational cuts.

This is not anti-science.
It is a clearer theory of scientific practice than any representationalist metaphysics has ever offered.


2. Representation Is the Weakest Part of Scientific Method, Not the Strongest

When realists accuse relational ontology of being anti-science, they are defending what they think science rests on:

“Scientific theories represent reality.”

But scientific theories don’t represent reality.
They organise relational dynamics,
coordinate predictions,
and stabilise interventions.

Representation is merely a metaphor —
and not a very good one.

In fact, clinging to representation yields a host of familiar puzzles:

  • What counts as the “real” structure of the world?

  • How exactly do models correspond to reality?

  • What does “correspondence” even mean?

  • How does mathematics map onto physical systems?

  • Why do multiple incompatible models work equally well?

  • How do we reconcile scale-specific models with “fundamental” ones?

These puzzles exist because representation is a conceptual dead end.

Relational ontology dissolves them by refusing the metaphor altogether.


3. Science Does Not Discover Pre-Cut Objects — It Constructs Systemic Cuts

A representational view says:

“Science reveals what’s already there.”

A relational view says:

“Science brings potential into a cut such that particular phenomena become stable and analysable.”

This is not constructionism.
Science does not “invent the world”.
But it does take undifferentiated potentials and make certain patterns tractable, through:

  • apparatus design

  • operational definitions

  • modelling practices

  • controlled interventions

  • semiotic tools

  • collaborative norms

  • technological infrastructures

These are not “biases”.
They are conditions of possibility for any phenomenon to appear.

Science does not mirror the world; it cuts it.


4. Relational Ontology Strengthens Objectivity — It Doesn’t Weaken It

Representational realists conflate objectivity with:

  • neutrality

  • detachment

  • correspondence

  • view-from-nowhere epistemology

But objectivity in scientific practice is none of these.

Objectivity is:

  • robustness across methods

  • reproducibility across perspectives

  • coherence across scales and contexts

  • stability across different apparatuses

  • constraint across communities

This is exactly what relational ontology formalises:

Objectivity is cross-perspectival stability produced by disciplined, coordinated cuts in semiotic and material systems.

Science does not need representation to be objective.
It needs coordination.


5. Relational Ontology Appears Anti-Science Only to Those Who Mistake Metaphysics for Method

Those who accuse relational ontology of being anti-science are usually defending something scientific practice does not require:

  • foundational objects

  • metaphysical realism

  • intrinsic properties

  • mind-independent truths encoded in language

  • fixed ontological categories

These are not scientific discoveries.
They are philosophical interpretations.

Relational ontology is not anti-science.
It is anti-philosophical-ballast-that-science-never-needed.


6. Relational Ontology Actually Makes Sense of Difficult Scientific Terrains That Realism Cannot Handle

Our readers already know this, but it’s worth listing explicitly.

The relational cut perspective handles:

  • quantum measurement without collapsing into observer mysticism

  • biology as constraints and affordances rather than encoded “information”

  • cognitive science without an inner theatre

  • ecology as patterns of co-individuation

  • complex systems without reductionism

  • neuroscience without representational neuro-myths

  • social science without psychologism or “inner” mental structures

Realism struggles here because it requires fixed objects, boundaries, and mirrors.
Relational ontology thrives where boundaries are permeable and systems interpenetrate.


7. Summary for the Online Commenter Who Types “LOL SO YOU’RE SAYING WE CAN JUST MAKE UP PHYSICS?”

  • Science is relational in practice, representational only in outdated metaphysics.

  • Relational ontology provides a better model of how science works.

  • It strengthens objectivity by grounding it in cross-perspectival constraint.

  • It eliminates representational puzzles entirely.

  • It does not say “anything goes” — it says “cuts are disciplined and system-constrained”.

  • It explains scientific method more coherently than any realist metaphysics.

To put it cleanly:

Relational ontology is not anti-science.
It is what scientific practice looks like once freed from metaphysical superstition.

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