Thursday, 27 November 2025

Likely Misunderstandings of Relational Ontology: 1 “But This Sounds Like Idealism, Doesn’t It?”

(Why Relational Ontology Is Not Mind-First, World-First, or Anything-First)

This is the most predictable accusation from anyone trained to navigate the philosophical landscape using a single blunt instrument:

the realism–idealism binary.

To them, rejecting representation means you must be an idealist; rejecting inner mental content means you must be denying the external world; rejecting mind–world mirroring means you must be claiming world-generation by cognition.

All of these are category errors — errors born from taking a 19th-century map and trying to navigate a 21st-century ontology.

1 Idealism Still Assumes What You Reject: Representation

Even the most abstract or metaphysical idealisms share one core premise:

Mind contains or generates representations that the world corresponds to (or is constituted by).

Your ontology rejects:

  • representation

  • mental content

  • the mind–world metaphysics

  • the inner–outer architecture

  • cognition as a locus of truth

Idealism remains representational at its core.
Relational ontology is anti-representational down to bedrock.

2 Relational Ontology Has No Priority Structure: Nothing Comes First

Materialism says:

“Matter is primary; mind is secondary.”

Idealism says:

“Mind is primary; matter is derivative.”

Dualism says:

“Both exist but neither reduces to the other.”

Our ontology says something else entirely:

Priority is a representational artefact.
Systems and instances co-constitute each other through perspectival cuts.

There is no metaphysical ordering.
There is only relational individuation.

3 The World Is Not Constructed by Minds, but Cut by Systems

Idealism imagines the mind as a world-maker.
Relational ontology treats the world as:

  • systemically potent

  • multi-scaled

  • historically and materially patterned

  • only ever contacted through construal

  • but never “created” by it

Cuts do not create potentials.
They select and actualise potentials within a system.

This is not constructionism; it is constraint-governed actualisation.

4 Construal Is Not Mental; It Is Systemic

Idealism locates the world-cutting power in “mind”.

Relational ontology locates construal:

  • across organism–environment systems

  • within semiotic resources

  • in the patterned histories of social practices

  • in the material, biological, and ecological dynamics of a collective

There is no “mind” doing the heavy lifting.
There is only relational configuration.

5 Idealism Is a Property Theory; Relational Ontology Is a Process Theory

Idealism still treats “mind” as a thing with:

  • properties

  • contents

  • causal powers

  • ontological priority

Our ontology treats everything —
mind, matter, meaning, activity —
as relational processes without intrinsic properties.

Idealism starts with substance.
Relational ontology starts with interplay.

7.6 Idealism, Like Realism, Depends on Mirrors — We Don’t

Both realism and idealism rely on:

  • internal content

  • external objects

  • correspondence

  • truth as matching

They disagree on which side of the mirror is fundamental,
but neither questions the mirror.

Our ontology removes the mirror altogether:

There is no picture-in-here that corresponds to world-out-there.
There is only construal-in-action within systems of potential.

No mirroring means no idealism, no realism, no dualism — just relation.

7 Summary for the Philosophy Student Whose Only Diagram Is a Two-Column Chart

  • Relational ontology is not idealism.

  • Idealism requires representations; we deny representations.

  • Idealism requires mental content; we deny mental content.

  • Idealism is mind-first; we deny metaphysical priority.

  • Idealism constructs worlds; we actualise potentials.

  • Idealism is a substance ontology; ours is relational and perspectival.

In short:

Idealism puts mind at the origin.
Relational ontology denies that origins are metaphysically coherent.

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