Einstein’s relationship to quantum mechanics is not—despite popular caricature—a simple conservatism or nostalgia for classical physics. His complaint was ontological. What quantum theory denied him was not determinism but a world that exists independently of any construal. He wanted phenomena without perspective, facts without the cut, reality without the relational condition of meaning.
To place Einstein inside the relational ontology is to watch his most cherished intuition unravel: he believed the universe must have a determinate structure of facts, even if hidden, even if unknowable. But in our model, nothing is determinate without the perspectival cut. There is no world “as it really is” behind the phenomena—not because the world is foggy, but because the very notion of “behind” is a misconstrual of potential as substance.
Let’s proceed cleanly.
1. Einstein’s Ontological Premise: The World Must Be Already Fully Actual
Einstein’s metaphysics rests on one conviction:
The universe has a definite set of actual facts, independent of any act of observing.
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A system is structured potential, not a catalogue of actual facts.
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An instance (an event) is the perspectival actualisation of that potential.
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No phenomenon exists without the cut—the construal that makes it a phenomenon.
This is the ontological tension that defines the whole dispute.
2. Hidden Variables: The Attempt to Restore the System as Substance
But in our framework, hidden variables are ontologically incoherent.
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system into instance
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potential into fact
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possibility into substance
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theory into phenomenon
3. The EPR Argument: A Protest Against Relational Individuation
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen famously argued that if quantum mechanics is complete, then distant systems cannot have independent realities. For Einstein, this was absurd—he took individuality to be an intrinsic property.
But in the relational ontology:
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Individuation is a cline from collective potential to distinct perspectives.
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There is no intrinsic individuality “in itself.”
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The cut that individuates systems is perspectival, not metaphysical.
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Individuals first
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Relations second
Our ontology asserts the opposite:
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Relations first
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Individuals as perspectival differentiations within relational potential
Einstein’s discomfort with nonlocality is not a scientific objection—it’s a refusal of relational individuation.
4. The Relational Response to Spooky Action
Spookiness arises only if one assumes facts are stored in each particle before the event.
Relational ontology says:
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There are no facts “stored” anywhere.
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There is only structured potential, relationally organised.
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Entanglement is not “instantaneous influence” but a single system of potential actualised at different perspectival cuts.
The “spookiness” dissolves once one abandons the myth of pre-existing facts.
5. Einstein’s Deeper Insight: The World Must Be Intelligible
Relational ontology agrees—just not with his solution.
6. Einstein’s Place in the Relational Sequence
Seen alongside Schrödinger:
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Schrödinger mistakenly substantialised the wave.
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Einstein mistakenly substantialised the hidden facts.
Conclusion: Einstein Wanted Certainty; Quantum Reality Offers Relation
Einstein’s tragedy is not that he was wrong, but that he chose the wrong layer of description. He imagined:
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the system as a hidden actualityrather than
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the system as structured potential
Relational ontology makes explicit what Einstein could not accept:
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